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Changes in FDA enforcement activities following
changes in federal administration: the case of
regulatory letters released to pharmaceutical
companies
Diane Nguyen1, Enrique Seoane-Vazquez1, Rosa Rodriguez-Monguio2* and Michael Montagne1

Abstract
Background: The United States (US) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for the protection of the
public health by assuring the safety, effectiveness and security of human drugs and biological products through the
enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and related regulations. These enforcement
activities include regulatory letters (i.e. warning letters and notice of violation) to pharmaceutical companies. A
regulatory letter represents the FDA’s first official notification to a pharmaceutical company that the FDA has
discovered a product or activity in violation of the FDCA.
This study analyzed trends in the pharmaceutical-related regulatory letters released by the FDA during the period
1997–2011 and assessed differences in the average number and type of regulatory letters released during the last
four federal administrations.
Methods: Data derived from the FDA webpage. Information about the FDA office releasing the letter, date,
company, and drug-related violation was collected. Regulatory letters were classified by federal administration.
Descriptive statistics were performed for the analysis.
Results: Between 1997 and 2011 the FDA released 2,467 regulatory letters related to pharmaceuticals. FDA
headquarters offices released 50.6% and district offices 49.4% of the regulatory letters. The Office of Prescription
Drug Promotion released the largest number of regulatory letters (850; 34.5% of the total), followed by the Office of
Scientific Investigations (131; 5.3%), and the Office of Compliance (105; 4.3%). During the 2nd Clinton Administration
(1997–2000) the average number of regulatory letters per year was 242.8 ± 45.6, during the Bush Administration
(2001–2008) it was 120.4 ± 33.7, and during the first three years of the Obama administration (2009–2011) it was
177.7.0 ± 17.0. The average number of regulatory letters released by the Office of Prescription Drug Promotion also
varied by administration: Clinton (122.3 ± 36.4), Bush (29.5 ± 16.2) and Obama (41.7 ± 11.1).
Conclusions: Most regulatory letters released by FDA headquarters were related to marketing and advertising
activities of pharmaceutical companies. The number of regulatory letters was highest during the second Clinton
administration, diminished during the Bush administrations, and increased again during the Obama administration.
A further assessment of the impact of changes in federal administration on the enforcement activities of the FDA is
required.
Keywords: Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Federal drug regulation enforcement, Warning letters, Notices of
violation
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Background
The United States (US) Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) is responsible for the protection of the public
health by assuring the safety, effectiveness and security
of human drugs and biological products through the
enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA) and related regulations. To ensure regulatory
compliance, the FDA headquarters, regional and district
offices may apply enforcement actions including: regulatory
letters, recall requests and market withdrawals, license
revocations or suspensions, debarment of individuals or
firms, disqualification of clinical investigators, injunctions,
seizures, criminal prosecution, and civil penalties [1].
A regulatory letter represents the FDA’s first official
notification to a pharmaceutical company that the FDA
has discovered a product or activity in violation of the
FDCA [2]. A regulatory letter can result from awareness
of a FDCA violation from an inspection or other sources
[3]. Regulatory letters serve as communication channels
that express the FDA’s assessment of compliance with the
law without obligating the agency to initiate enforcement
action. They also serve as one of the principal means to
achieve prompt voluntary compliance with the FDCA
before the FDA resorts to more severe enforcement actions
[3]. There are two types of regulatory letters: warning
letters and untitled letters. Untitled letters are also known
as notices of violation. Warning letters are issued to
alert pharmaceutical companies of significant regulatory
violations. Failure to adequately and promptly achieve
correction may lead to enforcement action [4]. Notices of
violation are untitled letters that describe violations that
do not meet the regulatory significance threshold for
warning letters [2]. Both types of regulatory letters
describe the violation observed and provide a citation of
the statutory provision and, if applicable, the regulation
violated. A warning letter requires correction of violation
and a written response within 15 days of receipt of letter;
otherwise, enforcement action may ensue. Enforcement
procedures also mandate that the FDA follow up to
evaluate whether the violations have been corrected
and the company’s adequacy in response [2]. A notice
of violation letter requests (rather than requires) ceasing
the inappropriate activities and a written response from
the company. And it does not include a warning statement that failure to take prompt correction may result in
enforcement action [2].
Regulatory letters may be issued by either the FDA
centers or district offices. Generally, district offices issue
regulatory letters to domestic pharmaceutical companies
based on inspections, whereas FDA headquarter centers
issue regulatory letters for advertising and promotional
violations or to foreign companies marketing products
in the US [4]. Except for in a few defined circumstances,
the FDA is not legally bound to warn pharmaceutical
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companies of their violations to the law preceding any
enforcement action taken [4].
The variability in the number of regulatory letters
released by the FDA was previously described in public
sector reports. The Office of Inspector General (OIG)
released a report in 1999 that cited the following reasons:
a more cooperative relationship fostered by the FDA with
the pharmaceutical industry; changes in the scope and
type of inspections; and pharmaceutical companies becoming more familiar with the regulation and less likely
to unintentionally commit regulatory violations [4].
Changes in policy also affected the regulatory letters
released by FDA. Beginning November 2001 and formally
in January 2002, the Department of Health and Human
Services directed the FDA to forward all drafts of regulatory letters to the FDA’s Office of Chief Counsel (OCC)
for review and approval before the letter could be issued
[5]. The FDA stated that the objective behind this policy
was to ensure that all draft letters were reassessed for
“legal sufficiency and consistency with agency policy”
[5]. The new policy of reviewing drafts of regulatory
letters resulted in a reduction in the number and types
(i.e. warning letters and notices of violation) of regulatory
letters issued [5-7].
A 2006 Committee on Government Reform (CGR)
evaluated the declining trend in regulatory letters
released during the Bush administrations [7]. According to
the CGR report, increased compliance by manufacturers
did not account for this decline, because the number of
violations observed by the FDA inspectors remained stable.
The CGR report cited several factors that could explain the
reduction in regulatory letters released, including: failure to
take enforcement actions recommended by field investigators; pursuing of actions less severe than recommended by
investigators; choosing to meet with firm representatives to
discuss violations and potential corrective measures instead
of taking formal action as recommended by field investigators; suspending recommendations with no official action
subsequently taken; and delaying acting on recommendations for an extended period of time. The FDA argued that
merely counting the number of regulatory letters released
did not accurately reflect a shift in enforcement strategy
that sought to pursue fewer but legally solid cases [8].
The GAO released a second report in 2006 highlighting
the need for improvements in FDA oversight of DTC
advertising [6]. This second GAO report found that the
FDA received considerably more final and draft advertising
materials submitted by pharmaceutical companies than
could possibly be reviewed due to limitations in staff, and
therefore, only a small percentage was actually reviewed.
In August 2009, the FDA announced a new policy
initiative to improve the effectiveness of the FDA
enforcement system [9]. This initiative included the
following changes related to regulatory letters: to accelerate
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the warning letter issuance process by limiting FDA OCC
review to only draft letters of significant legal issues;
to prioritize enforcement follow-up on warning letters
to assess companies’ reported compliance; to consider
enforcement action even prior to issuance of warning letter
to address significant public health concerns and violations
if necessary; and to develop “close-out” process for warning
letters issued to confirm that all violations have been appropriately rectified and to provide incentive for companies to
comply with regulations [9]. The new policy initiative modified the November 2001 policy requiring OCC review of all
regulatory letters. Under the new policy, OCC reviews
selected regulatory letters including novel, controversial, or
sensitive legal issues; drug misbranding charges; and violations of the general current good manufacturing practice
(CGMP) regulations [2].
Although previous studies and reports have examined
the FDA warning letters and notices of violation to
pharmaceutical companies during a limited time period
or in regards to specific contexts, like direct-to-consumer
advertising or quality-of-life claims, [4-7,10-16] no studies
have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the number
and type of regulatory letters issued by the different offices
of the FDA over a comprehensive period of time covering
several federal administrations. Therefore, the objectives of
this study were two-fold: 1) to assess trends in the number
of pharmaceutical-related warning letters and notices of
violation released by the FDA between 1997 and 2011; and
2) to evaluate differences in the type of regulatory letters
released during the last four federal administrations by type
of regulatory letter and releasing office.

Methods
The data source of this study consisted of warning letters
and notice of violation letters to companies as supplied by
the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER)
Freedom of Information Office (FOI) on the FDA’s website
[17]. The study focused on regulatory letters released by
the CDER headquarters, including the following CDER
Offices: 1) Office of Prescription Drug Promotion
(formerly Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and
Communications); 2) Office of Drug Security, Integrity,
and Recalls (formerly Division of New Drugs and Labeling
Compliance); and 3) Office of Manufacturing and Product
Quality; 4) Office of Scientific Investigations; 5) Office of
Compliance, and 6) District Offices.
Data were collected from warning and notices of violation letters issued between January 1997, when the FDA
began posting the letters on the website, and December
2011. Regulatory letters were excluded from data collection
if they were either not available on the FDA website or were
duplicate letters. The following information was extracted
from each letter and subsequently documented in an Excel
file: the type of letter, the date of issuance, the FDA Office
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or Division releasing the letter, and the company. District
offices unrelated to human drugs and biologics (i.e. medical
devices, blood and blood products, oxygen and medical
gases, cosmetics, sanitation, animal feed and drugs, food,
tobacco, and dietary products) were excluded from the
analysis. All regulatory letters in the study period were
classified by respective federal administration. To ensure
the reliability of the data collection, one researcher
performed the initial data collection while a second
researcher verified the data extraction and entry process.
District offices letters were collected and classified
separately by two researchers. Discrepancies in data
collection were solved checking the regulatory letters
against the original source. Descriptive statistics were
computed for the variables included in the analysis.

Results
We found 2,467 pharmaceutical-related regulatory letters
released to companies by CDER and FDA district offices
in the period 1997 to 2011 (Table 1). Regulatory letters
included 1,737 warning letters (70.4% of total regulatory
letters) and 719 notices of violation (29.1%). Information
for 11 regulatory letters (0.4%) was not available.
The average annual number of all regulatory letters was
242.8 ± 45.6 during the second Clinton administration,
120.4 ± 33.7 during the two Bush administrations and
177.0 ± 17.0 during the first three years of the Obama
administration (Figure 1). There was an average annual
decrease of 122.4 regulatory letters between the Clinton
and Bush years and an average annual increase of 57.3
regulatory letters between the Bush and Obama years.
The analysis of the type of regulatory letters released
by CDER headquarters and district offices revealed a
difference in the issuance trend of warning letters and
notices of violation between administrations (Table 1).
The average annual number of warning letters released
during the second Clinton administration decreased by
22.2% in the Bush administrations (127.3 and 99.0
letters, respectively). However, the average annual number
of notices of violation released between the second
Clinton administration and the Bush administrations
decreased by 81.7% from 114.3 to 20.9 letters, respectively.
The average annual number of both warning letters and
notices of violation increased during the first three years
of the Obama administration to 145.3 warning letters and
31.7 notices of violation.
Offices in FDA headquarters released 1,248 regulatory
letters (50.6% of the total) and district offices released
1,219 letters (49.4%). District offices released only warning
letters. The Office of Prescription Drug Promotion
released 850 (68.1%) of all the regulatory letters from
CDER headquarters in the study period (Table 2). The
Office of Scientific Investigations released 131 (10.5%),
followed by 105 (8.4%) from the Office of Compliance, 98
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Table 1 Regulatory letters released by the FDA by type of letter, 1997–2011
Clinton 2nd administration

Bush administrations

Obama administration

Type of Letter

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Warning Letters

122

152

116

119

131

97

Notices of Violation 135

143

103

76

65

26

Not Available

1

4

Total

258

299

84

95

88

20

13

14

1
219

195

196

123

105

(7.9%) from the Office of Manufacturing and Product
Quality, and 59 (4.7%) from the Office of Drug Security,
Integrity and Recalls.
During the Second Clinton administration warning
letters represented 52.4% of the total number of regulatory
letters released, 82.2% during the Bush administrations,
and 81.8% during the first three years of the Obama
administration.
The trend of all regulatory letters released from the
Office of Prescription Drug Promotion (OPDP) between
1997 and 2011 was similar to the trend described previously for all regulatory letters from CDER headquarters.
The average annual number of OPDP regulatory letters
was 122.3 ± 36.4 during the second Clinton administration,
29.5 ± 16.2 during the Bush administrations and 41.7 ± 11.1
during the first three years of the Obama administration
(Figure 2). This is an average annual decrease of 92.7
OPDP letters between the second Clinton and the two
Bush administrations and an average annual increase
of 12.2 OPDP letters between the Bush and Obama
administrations.
The analysis of the type of regulatory letters released
by the OPDP revealed a difference in the issuance trend
of warning letters and notices of violation between
administrations (Table 3). The average annual number of
OPDP warning letters released during the Clinton
administration remained relatively stable through the

108

102

107

72

118
11

9

9

1

2

117

83

2009

2010

2011

146

155

135

1,737

29

40

26

719

2
129

All
Total

177

11
195

161

2,467

Bush administrations at 7.3 and 8.9 warning letters,
respectively. Conversely, the average annual number of
OPDP notices of violation released between the second
Clinton administration to the Bush administration
decreased from 113.8 to 20.5 untitled letters, respectively. The average annual number of OPDP warning
letters was also stable during the first three years of the
Obama administration with 10.0, while the OPDP
notices of violation increased, in comparison with the
Bush Administrations, to an average of 31.0 untitled
letters. The relative weight of OPDP warning letters over
the total number of regulatory letters released increased
during the study period. During the second Clinton
administration regulatory letters released by the OPDP
represented 5.9% of the total number of regulatory
letters released, 30.1% during the Bush administrations,
and 24.0% during the first three years of the Obama
administration. The trend of OPDP regulatory letters
mirror those differences found between warning letters
and notices of violation released by CDER headquarters
and district offices.

Discussion
This study is the first to assess differences in regulatory
letters issued by four different federal administrations
including the Obama administration. The study results
revealed variability in the number of regulatory letters

Figure 1 Regulatory letters to pharmaceutical companies released by the FDA’s, 1997-2011.
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Table 2 Regulatory letters by releasing division/office, 1997–2011
Administration

Clinton 2nd
administration

Bush administrations

Obama
administration

All

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Prescription Drug Promotion

140

162

108

79

69

27

25

23

29

22

20

21

43

52

30

850

Office of Scientific Investigations

2

4

8

5

11

2

2

3

6

9

10

16

20

15

18

131

19

2

1

40

17

3

2

3

4

8

16

17

98

4

1

20

3

6

6

2

59

Compliance

1

1

2

12

Manufacturing and Product Quality 14

7

5

11

6

1

Security, Integrity and Recalls

8

1

1

7

Compliance Risk Management
and Surveillance
Drugs and Labeling Compliance

10
1

105

1

1

1

1

Prescription Drug Compliance

1

Manufacturing and Product
Quality/Division of Compliance
Risk Management and Surveillance

1

1

1

Unapproved Drugs and Labeling
Compliance

1

1

District Offices

94

116

96

98

108

81

58

71

60

81

29

85

60

89

93

1,219

Total

258

299

219

195

196

123

105

108

102

117

83

129

177

195

161

2,467

Note: 1 letter released in 1998 by the OMPQ was coauthored by the Division of Prescription Drug Compliance and Surveillance. The names of the Divisions and
Offices changed over time. The most current names are included in the table.

released by CDER headquarters and district offices during
different years of the same administration and also among
the federal administrations analyzed in the study period.
This variability can be related to the behavior of the
pharmaceutical companies, changes in drug regulation
and policy, and changes in FDA’s enforcement procedures
and interpretation of drug regulation and policy.
In general, pharmaceutical companies aim to comply
with drug regulation and policy to minimizing the time,
cost and liability issues that could result from FDA’s
issuance of regulatory letters. The number of regulatory

letters may temporarily increase immediately after
changes in regulations and policies and decline after the
moment the pharmaceutical companies understand both
the changes and the FDA’s interpretation of the new
regulations and policies [4]. This may explain the spike
and posterior decline in regulatory letters observed
during the second Clinton administration and the first 3
years of the Obama administration.
Regulatory changes may also affect the number and
type of regulatory letters. Two significant amendments
to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act were

Figure 2 Regulatory letters released by the office of prescription drug promotion, 1997-2011.

Nguyen et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:27
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/27

Page 6 of 7

Table 3 Regulatory letters released by the office of prescription drug promotion by type of letter, 1997–2011
Clinton 2nd administration
Type of Letter

Bush administrations

Obama administration

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

5

15

5

4

4

1

Notices of Violation 134

143

103

75

65

26

Not Available

1

4

Total

140

162

Warning Letters

4

12

15

14

11

10

20

11

14

8

9

11

1
108

79

69

27

25

introduced during the period of analysis: The Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA)
and the Food and Drug Administration Amendments
Act (FDAAA) of 2007. These amendments introduced
important changes in the FDA regulation related with
post-marketing surveillance and pharmaceutical marketing
that could impact the number of warning letters released.
Additionally, in 1997 the FDA published new guidance that
enabled the use of broadcast direct to consumer advertising
(DTC) of pharmaceuticals. This change in guidance
propelled an increase in the number of DTC materials submitted by pharmaceutical companies to the FDA and also
in the number of regulatory letters released by the former
Division of Prescription Drug Compliance and Surveillance
during the second Clinton Administration [5,6,18].
Changes in internal FDA enforcement procedures
may also affect regulatory letters. The 2002 change in
procedures that directed the FDA to forward all drafts
of regulatory letters to the FDA’s Office of Chief Counsel
for review and approval, [5] resulted in a substantial decline
in the number of notice of violation letters [5,6,10].
This shift in enforcement strategy may explain why the
number of warning letters –used for significant regulatory
violations- remained relatively unchanged during the
second Clinton and the two Bush administrations; while
the number of notice of violation letters–used for less
serious violations- declined significantly during the same
period. The effect of this change in enforcement strategy
is also apparent in the first three years of the Obama
administration where two thirds of the regulatory letters
were warning letters. Availability of limited funds for FDA
enforcement efforts is another factor that may explain the
reduction in the number of notices of violation letters by
the Bush administrations and the first three years of the
Obama administration [8].
The new enforcement procedures implemented by the
FDA in August 2009 [9], were designed to ultimately
facilitate FDA issuance of warning letters on a timely
manner and ensure prompt corrective action. This new
policy may help to explain the increase in the number of
warning letters issued by CDER headquarters and district
offices, and particularly by the Office of Prescription
Drug Promotion during the first three years of the
Obama administration in comparison with the Bush
Administrations.

2009

2010

2011

13

12

5

130

28

40

25

712

2
23

29

22

20

21

All
Total

43

8
52

30

850

The impact of policy changes in FDA enforcement
actions can be observed subsequent to changes in the
administrations that were evaluated in this study. The
sudden shifts in regulatory letters observed during the
initial years of the Bush and Obama administrations
assessed in this study indicate that the FDA enforcement
policy is directly influenced by changes in federal administration. The sudden shifts in regulatory enforcement could
have significant impact in pharmaceutical companies’
compliance with regulation and, ultimately, in public
health. Both types of letters, warnings and notices of
violation, are motivated by violations in federal regulation.
The reduction in the number of notice of violation letters
seen in the Bush and three first years of the Obama
administrations may result in using FDA scarce resources
to target the most significant violations of the regulation,
but also that a significant number of violations of
federal regulations are not disclosed, prosecuted, and
corrected. As a result, the mandate of the FDA to
ensure the enforcement of the federal regulation is
weakened, and the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals
is compromised.
Limitations

Information about the budget and resources dedicated
to enforcement activities in each administration was not
available. There were a number of regulatory letters that
could not be retrieved or were no longer available in the
FDA online database, and this highlights the issue of
online materials not truly being archival.
This study assessed FDA’s enforcement activities.
Other federal and state departments also collaborate in
the enforcement of pharmaceutical regulations. While
those enforcement activities were outside of the scope of
this study, future research could examine trends in other
components of the executive enforcement. Moreover,
pharmaceutical companies’ activities such as off-label
promotion, illegal marketing of drugs or failing to report
safety data may result in civil and criminal liability. Cases
brought by the federal government against pharmaceutical
companies because of illegal behavior have resulted in
settlements amounting billions of dollars [19].
Additionally, information about violations contained in
forms FDA-483 for the period of analysis and informal
FDA communications with companies that did not result
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in a warning or notice of violation letter was not available
at the FDA website.
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3.

4.

Conclusions
The annual number of pharmaceutical related regulatory
letters issued by the FDA and specifically CDER
headquarters and district offices was related to the
federal administration. The number of regulatory letters
released between 1997 and 2011 indicate a general trend
that the number of letters was greatest during the
second Clinton administration, decreased during the
two Bush administrations and then increased again during
the first three years of the Obama administration. Most of
the regulatory letters were related to marketing and
advertising activities of pharmaceutical companies.
The reduction in the number of regulatory letters,
especially notices of violation, may derive from the
prioritization of FDA’s limited resources, but it results in
violations of federal regulations that are not disclosed,
prosecuted, and corrected through appropriate FDA
enforcement activities.
A further assessment of the impact of changes in federal
administration on the enforcement policy of the FDA is
required. Additionally, the political independence of the
FDA’s regulatory activities and provision of funding to carry
out FDA enforcement activities should be commensurate
with the FDA competencies and responsibilities.
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